DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 204 216 SO 013 441

AUTHOR Johansen, Robert C.
TITLE Jimmy Carter's National Security Policy: A World Order Critique.
INSTITUTION Institute for World Order, New York, N.Y.
SPONS AGENCY World Order Models Project.
REPORT NO ISBN-0-911646-11-4; WOMP-WP-14
PUB DATE 80
NOTE 51p.
AVAILABLE FROM Institute for World Order, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 ($1.50, quantity discounts available).

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS *Foreign Policy; Military Training; *National Defense; Nuclear Warfare
IDENTIFIERS *Carter (Jimmy); *National Security

ABSTRACT

This essay evaluates the Carter administration's behavior on national security questions and appraises the extent to which it meets Carter's initial professed national security goals. These goals include the intention to reduce military expenditures, to halt the nuclear arms buildup of the United States and U.S.S.R., to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to additional countries, to cut U.S. arms exports, and to curtail overt and covert U.S. intervention in Third World countries. The analysis demonstrates that the Carter administration has violated its own professed goals and the security interests of the U.S. public. Carter's foreign policy, like that of preceding administrations, has been deficient because it has rigidly adhered to national interests too narrowly defined, and has not promoted structural solutions to problems that are structural in origin. To be successful, an alternative policy approach must decrease the prospects for war and inequity in the short run and advance a strategy for fundamental transformation of the international system in the long run. Such a foreign policy is proposed. Its political feasibility and value impact are examined in alternative U.S. responses to two concrete cases: the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The essay concludes with eight guidelines for developing a new U.S. foreign policy that will serve the human interest. (Author)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED2042216

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

Jimmy Carter's National Security Policy: A World Order Critique

Robert C. Johansen

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

VIRGINIA HEISERMAN

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

SP 013 441

WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT
WORKING PAPER NUMBER FOURTEEN
1980

This paper is one in a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue, and political action which will contribute to a movement for a just world order. The papers will deal with major global problems facing humanity, and particularly vexing contemporary political, economic, social, and cultural issues within an analytic and normative framework guided by the concepts and values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological stability. Special emphasis will be given to the necessity and feasibility of structural transformation of today's fragmented world in order to resolve these problems and achieve just world order results.

A Working Group of the World Order Models Project (WOMP) will use these papers in its new program aimed at publishing a statement in 1980 outlining the strategies for realizing just world order during this century. We invite interested individuals throughout the globe to respond to the various papers either directly to the individual authors or to WOMP. These communications will figure significantly in the WOMP Working Group's final statement. Where appropriate, the responses and critiques will be published in *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy.*

WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT

Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (Delhi, India)

Institute for World Order (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.)

Synergic Developments Associated to
Foundacion Bariloche (Bariloche, Argentina)

World Order Studies Project (Tokyo, Japan)

Directors: Saul Mendlovitz, Yoshikazu Sakamoto

© *Institute for World Order, Inc., 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017, U.S.A., 1980*

ISBN 0-911646-11-4

Table of Contents

		Page
1.	**The Goals and Instruments of Jimmy Carter's Security Policy**	4
	Military Expenditures	4
	Nuclear Arms	5
	Nuclear Proliferation	10
	Arms Exports	14
	Intervention	20
2.	**The Values Guiding U.S. Policymakers**	25
3.	**An Alternative U.S. Foreign Policy**	28
	Guidelines	29
	Applications	34
	A Note on the Utility of a Value-Centered Approach	41

List of Tables

Table		Page
I	Military Expenditures	4
II	Partial List of Requested Expenditures for Additional Nuclear Weapons, FY 1981	8
III	Requests for Research and Development, FY 1981	10
IV	Summary Comparison of U.S. Officials' Professed and Implicit Values on Security Issues, 1977-80	25
V	Summary Comparison of Policy Orientations on Security Issues	28
VI	The Impact of Nuclear Threats on National Security	31

JIMMY CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: A WORLD ORDER CRITIQUE*

Robert C. Johansen†

This essay evaluates the Carter administration's behavior on national security questions and appraises the extent to which it meets Carter's initial professed national security goals. These goals include the intention to reduce military expenditures, to halt the nuclear arms buildup of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to additional countries, to cut U.S. arms exports, and to curtail overt and covert U.S. intervention in Third World countries. The analysis demonstrates that the Carter administration has violated its own professed goals and the security interests of the U.S. public. Carter's foreign policy, like that of preceding administrations, has been deficient because it (1) has rigidly adhered to national interests too narrowly defined, and (2) has not promoted structural solutions to problems that are structural in origin. It also has failed to advance world order values of peace, economic justice, human rights, and ecological balance, which together help define the "global human interest."

To be successful, an alternative policy approach must decrease the prospects for war and inequity in the short run and advance a strategy for fundamental transformation of the international system in the long run. Such a foreign policy is proposed. Its political feasibility and value impact are examined in alternative U.S. responses to two concrete cases: the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The essay concludes with eight guidelines for developing a new U.S. foreign policy that will serve the human interest.

Immediately before or soon after taking the oath of office, Jimmy Carter defined five policy goals that he intended to pursue throughout his administra-

---

* Originally prepared for the Conference on Foreign Policy from a World Order Perspective, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, May 22–23, 1980.

† *President, Institute for World Order.*

tion in the quest for national security. These goals, by which he distinguished himself during the election campaign and first months in office, included (1) reducing military expenditures, (2) halting the nuclear arms buildup of the United States and the Soviet Union, (3) preventing the spread of nuclear-weapons technology to additional countries, (4) cutting U.S. arms exports, and (5) avoiding overt U.S. military intervention in Third World countries while curtailing covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

In a speech before the United Nations in 1976, Carter warned of the need for an extraordinary effort to halt the growth of nuclear armaments: "Of one thing I am certain—the hour is too late for business as usual, for politics as usual, or for diplomacy as usual." Even allowing for the familiar excesses of political rhetoric, he did offer the vision of a genuine departure from past diplomatic practice: "A mutual balance of terror is an inadequate foundation upon which to build a peaceful and stable world order. One of the greatest long-term threats to the national security of every country now lies in the disintegration of the international order. Balance of power politics must be supplemented by world order politics if the foreign policies of nations are to be relevant to modern needs."[1]

Four years after these statements of intention, the 1980's burst upon us in a series of potentially explosive international events. Indeed, Carter's warning about the gradual "disintegration of the international order" appeared plausible. For some people these events revived questions about his effectiveness as a leader equal to the problems of the 1980 s. Of course, similar questions apply to all members of the policymaking community and to Congress and the public as well. A re-examination of the basic goals and instruments of U.S. foreign policy is imperative if we are to influence positively the onrush of events.

Could a fundamentally different foreign policy have prevented or now cope more effectively with the continuing arms buildup, the spread of nuclear weapons technology, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the growth and diplomatic consequences of the anti-United States sentiment in Iran, and the military and psychological preparation for a U.S. interventionary policy in the Middle East? This essay seeks to answer that question by (1) identifying the goals and basic values that policymakers now advance through U.S. security policy, (2) assessing the utility and desirability of these values as guides for policymaking, and (3) illustrating how an alternative approach could be effectively operationalized in concrete policies for the 1980's.

1. The text of this speech of May 13, 1976, is reprinted in Jimmy Carter, "Three Steps toward Nuclear Responsibility," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* October 1976, p. 14.

From the beginning, the Carter administration sensed that the human species is living in a period of unprecedented danger and unusual opportunity. A central question for us all is to determine whether, on balance, Carter's policies have been imaginatively responsive to the opportunities for transforming the old balance of power into a more just and peaceful world order, or instead have deepened the danger by reverting, as Carter himself warned against, to politics and diplomacy as usual.

The following analysis rests on the understanding that any policy decision involves a choice among alternatives, and any deliberate, reflective choice utilizes values as criteria for choice, whether they are recognized or not. This essay seeks to identify the basic values underlying the choices of Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, and others.[2] It then compares the values that officials professed in their policies to the values that were implicitly embedded in their behavior. This value clarification lays the groundwork for a better understanding of whether alternative policies could have led or now lead to a fuller realization of preferred world order values of peace, social and economic justice, human rights, and ecological balance for all people.[3] To strive for these values is to serve what I will call the "human interest." We begin with an assessment of the Carter administration's performance in achieving the five goals outlined above.

---

2. A more comprehensive discussion of the analytic approach utilized in this essay is contained in the discussion at the end of this essay, pp. 41–46 below. Readers especially interested in examining the benefits of a value-centered approach in foreign policy analysis may want to read that section at the outset.

3. In my judgment, the maximization of these values should guide the making of policy. This essay is, in part, an effort to spell out more concretely the policies that will advance these values on which a majority of the world's people presumably would agree. I have undertaken a similar but far more comprehensive task for U.S. foreign policy in general in *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

The fourfold value framework was first developed by participants in the World Order Models Project, as illustrated in their series of books, "Preferred Worlds for the 1990's." See Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Johan Galtung, *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1980); Rajni Kothari, *Footsteps Into the Future: Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an Alternative* (New York: The Free Press, 1974); Gustavos Lagos and Horatio H. Godoy, *Revolution of Being: A Latin American View of the Future* (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Ali A. Mazrui, *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1976); and Saul H. Mendlovitz, Ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990's* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

1. The Goals and Instruments of Jimmy Carter's Security Policy

Military Expenditures

In steadily increasing U.S. military expenditures throughout his administration, President Carter reversed one of his foremost early goals. When running for president in 1976 Jimmy Carter promised if elected to cut military spending annually by $5 to $7 billion. When running for re-election as president in 1980, he boasted about being the first peacetime president since World War II to increase real military spending every year in office[4] (see Table I). Carter's new stance

Table I

Military Expenditures 1977-1981
Billions of Dollars

	Fiscal Year				
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Current Prices					
Total Obligational Authority	108.3	116.8	124.8	139.3	158.7
Outlays	108.8	111.7	115.0	127.4	142.7
FY 1981 Prices					
Outlays	127.6	131.0	135.5	138.1	142.7

Sources: Data are taken from Harold Brown, *Defense Department Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980,* and *Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979 and 1980).

4. Jimmy Carter, "Press Conference of Feburary 13," *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 80 (March 1980), pp. 36C-36D.

did not occur because of any Soviet shift to a more belligerent posture after Carter became president. Instead, after listening to the military-industrial lobby as president, Carter began to claim that because of his new leadership "a dangerous decline in defense spending has been reversed." He stressed that in constant dollars "defense spending dropped by one third in those eight years before I became President." Only since he assumed office ". . . have outlays for defense spending been increased every year."[5]

Twelve months before the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan, President Carter said, "our goal . . . is to increase the real level of defense expenditures. This is our goal."[6] Carter stressed that not only his FY 1981 budget but also his five year plan for increased spending preceded the invasion of Afghanistan.[7] In January 1980, the president proposed a 5.4 percent increase for the coming year and a 25 percent increase above inflation over the next five years.[8] After intensive diplomatic efforts, the United States also obtained commitments from members of NATO to increase their expenditures 3 percent above inflation each year for the foreseeable future.

The bare figures in Table I demonstrate that official behavior achieved a result directly opposed to the original value of reducing expenditures. The rationale for the budget increases will be evaluated in the next section.

Nuclear Arms

When he took office President Carter announced his intention to slow both the strategic nuclear arms buildup between the United States and Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. In his first State of the Union message he declared: "We will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth."[9]

Instead of making progress toward this goal, the Carter administration, with the support of Congress, launched a major new round in the arms competition.

---

5. Jimmy Carter, "National Security Goals," *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 80 (March 1980), p. 36B.

6. Text of press conference, *New York Times,* December 1, 1978.

7. Carter (fn. 5), p. 36B.

8. Harold Brown, *Defense Department Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981,* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 16.

9. Text in the *New York Times,* January 21, 1977.

Officials carefully planned the buildup as an integral part of U.S. policies for arms control. Although the President's request for a delay in ratifying the SALT II treaty came only after Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan in December 1979, the increased pace of weapons development clearly preceded this event, as the summary of expenditures suggests. Officials tailored the SALT treaty to allow every new weapons system that the Pentagon wanted or would have built in the absence of a treaty:[10]

- the development of land- and sea-based cruise missiles and their deployment at the expiration of the SALT protocol after two years, which was approximately the time needed to prepare the technology;
- the development of a much larger and more accurate new intercontinental missile, the MX;
- the deployment of the enormous Trident submarine and very accurate Trident II missile;
- the maneuvering re-entry warhead;
- the deployment of any number of new intermediate range nuclear missiles, such as the Pershing II; and
- the manufacture and deployment of thousands of additional warheads on missiles allowed by the ceilings.

This buildup occurred despite the U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union in the number of deliverable, strategic warheads by nearly a 2 to 1 ratio—9,500 warheads to 4,800 at the time. Although the Soviet missile force could carry more weight, this capacity did not jeopardize the deterring ability of U.S. forces. Even if the United States reduced the number of its nuclear warheads by 90 percent, it would still have more than twice the number of warheads required to destroy all Soviet cities over 100,000 people, even after suffering a first strike itself.[11]

Rather than freeze its own nuclear development temporarily as a challenge to the Soviet Union to reciprocate, the United States pressed ahead with weapons development in every possible area. Most of the weapons under development were destabilizing because they were designed to fight a nuclear war rather than simply to deter one. One example can clarify the distinction between establishing a war-fighting capability or counterforce strategy, as it is commonly described, and maintaining a simple strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Officials claimed they needed a new, mobile, intercontinental ballistic missile

10. See Robert C. Johansen, "Arms Bazaar: SALT Was Never Intended to Disarm," *Harper's* (May 1979), pp. 21-29.

11. This point is elaborated in Robert C. Johansen, *Toward a Dependable Peace: A Proposal for an Appropriate Security System* (New York: Institute for World Order, 1978), p. 34.

(ICBM), the MX, because the Minuteman missiles would become vulnerable to Soviet MIRVs (multiple, independently-targetable re-entry vehicles) in the mid-1980's. Yet officials did not choose to develop a mobile missile which would maximize U.S. invulnerability and minimize the offensive threat to Soviet defenses—the rational approach if one wanted to stabilize U.S.-Soviet military competition. Instead, U.S. officials chose the *largest* of all the proposed new MX designs, thus making U.S. invulnerability more difficult to achieve. Policymakers implemented the offensive value of maximizing the threat to the Soviet Union rather than the defensive value of minimizing the vulnerability of the U.S. deterrent. "The conclusion is inescapable that the military wants the MX in order to threaten Soviet ICBMs."[12]

This conclusion applies to other new weapons as well. The increased yield and accuracy of the MX, combined with the new Trident II and the advanced Mark 12-A warhead being placed on Minuteman missiles will severely threaten the Soviet Union's land-based missile force, which constitutes 70 percent of its strategic arsenal. This will make Soviet leaders especially nervous during times of crisis, prompt them to adopt a strategy of firing their missiles before waiting out an apparently provocative U.S. (or Chinese?) action to determine its true quality (and origin), and stimulate intensive Soviet efforts to equal or exceed U.S. deployments.[13] Despite Carter's proclaimed desire to spend only the money required to keep the peace, not one of the major, new U.S. strategic weapons was required for simple deterrence of attack. They were useful only to gain diplomatic influence and prestige and to threaten or attack the Soviet missile force.[14]

President Carter thus accelerated a trend in recent years to deploy weapons with little regard for their impact on security. Carter and his advisers were uninfluenced by the record of the past decade in which the U.S. expenditure of nearly one trillion dollars for military purposes left U.S. citizens less secure than at the beginning of that period. Not only did the White House, Pentagon, and Congress move to a less stable military posture, they also exacerbated the redundancy of weapons which already gave the United States the capacity to destroy Soviet society forty times over and the U.S. and Soviet Union together seven times more than enough explosives to destroy throughout the entire world all metropolitan areas of 100,000 or more people. Officials designed the 1981 budget in the hope of softening hawkish Senate opposition to the SALT treaty so that Carter could achieve its ratification and thereby the appearance of a

12. Herbert Scoville, "America's Greatest Construction: Can It Work?," *The New York Review*, Vol. 27 (March 20, 1980), p. 13.

13. As the former Deputy Director of the CIA, Herbert Scoville, concluded: "The MX system can only lead to vast, uncontrolled arms competition that will undermine the security of the U.S. and increase the dangers of nuclear conflict." *Ibid.*, p. 17.

14. Scoville substantiates this point in *ibid.*, p. 13.

diplomatic triumph, while at the same time intending to spend $20 billion more for the armed forces than during the preceding year. Table II contains a partial list of requests for additional nuclear weapons.

Funds devoted to research and development for new weapons often reveal the prospects for the future. In the 1981 budget requests, research and development

Table II

Partial List of Requested Expenditures for Additional Nuclear Weapons, FY 1981

$2 billion	to the Department of Energy to produce additional nuclear explosives and to improve the Department's capacity for producing 20,000 weapons in the coming decade
1.6 billion	for a larger, more accurate, mobile ICBM--the MX
$1.1 billion	for development of the new Trident submarine
$855 million	for Trident I missiles
$14 million	for installing Trident I missiles on Poseidon submarines
$179 million	to put more accurate, larger warheads on Minuteman missiles
$36 million	for developing the Trident II missile
$125 million	for anti-satellite weapons development
$266 million	for developing anti-ballistic missile systems, despite the agreement in the SALT I treaty to restrict deployment of anti-missile missiles
$146 million	for Pershing II missiles to place a new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe
$111 million	for advanced missile research
$206 million	for developing a new sea-launched cruise missile
$188 million	for developing a ground-launched cruise missile
$877 million	for air-launched cruise missiles and their carrier aircraft
$46 million	for a new manned bomber

Source: Compiled from Harold Brown, *Defense Department Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

for the Department of Defense, for the military work (mostly nuclear) of the Department of Energy, and for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration constituted 65 percent of all government-sponsored research. As Table III shows, the Pentagon and the military activities of the Department of Energy exceeded by more than $5 billion the combined funds for research and development allocated to *all* the following departments and agencies:

Department of Energy
Department of Agriculture
Department of Interior
Department of Labor
Department of Transportation
Department of Commerce
Department of Education
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of Justice
Department of the Treasury
Department of State
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Health and Human Services (including the National Institutes of Health)
National Science Foundation
Environmental Protection Agency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Veterans Administration
Tennessee Valley Authority
Agency for International Development
Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation
Smithsonian Institution
Corps of Engineers
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Communications Commission
Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations
Federal Trade Commission
Library of Congress

Despite the promising rhetoric for arms reductions in the first State of the Union address, the Carter administration did not develop a single proposal simply to halt the nuclear arms buildup in general or to freeze it totally at present levels. Like preceding administrations, Carter's government took no visible steps toward the announced goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Table III

Requests for Research and Development, FY 1981

	Billions of Dollars
Department of Defense	16.6
Department of Energy, military purposes only	1.3
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	5.6
All other departments and agencies*	12.6
Total	36.1

*Includes non-military research of the Department of Energy.

Source: Executive Office of the President, *Special Analyses: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 303-24.

Nuclear Proliferation

The second major component of Carter's nuclear policy sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to additional countries.[15] The Carter administration proposed three means for accomplishing this goal.

The first and most heavily emphasized aimed to control the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes until international safeguards were established and reactor design could be improved to reduce the possibility that power plants and their fuel might be used to develop nuclear weapons. Joseph Nye, the Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, and chairman of the National Security Council Group on Non-Proliferation, attempted to develop policies to implement this goal.[16] However, for two reasons these policies achieved only limited success.

First, when value tradeoffs were required, the Carter Administration sacrificed nonproliferation goals to the accumulation of U.S. power and influence. Officials occasionally failed to implement their own guidelines restricting the

15. Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address," text in *New York Times*, January 21, 1977.

16. Joseph S. Nye, "Nonproliferation: A Long-Term Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56 (April 1978), pp. 601-23.

transfer of technology or fuel to other countries. For example, after the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, the United States offered to resume military assistance to Pakistan despite its refusal to stop developing its own technology for processing weapons grade fissionable material. This Pakistani effort had earlier (April 1979) stimulated the United States to cut off assistance.

To quiet Indian objections to U.S. offers to Pakistan, as well as to compete with Moscow for influence in India, the United States also decided to resume shipments of fissionable material to India. Washington previously had terminated these to protest India's explosion of a nuclear device and refusal to place all of its nuclear facilities under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). According to Nye, under U.S. nonproliferation legislation, "the president would have little alternative but to seek an amicable disengagement in our nuclear cooperation if India cannot take this step [of full-scope safeguards] within the 18-month transition period."[17] However, soon after the period expired, the Carter administration decided to ship enriched uranium to India. Despite a unanimous decision in May 1980 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the sale was not permissible under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, passed by Congress in 1978, executive officials claimed they were not violating any guidelines because India had made the request for the fuel before the expiration date. The United States in practice has dampened its nonproliferation efforts toward India and Pakistan, with widespread effects throughout the world, in favor of a South Asian military buildup.

The second weakness of U.S. nonproliferation policy was that the United States failed to take account of the need eventually to establish rules governing the use of fissionable materials which *all* countries of the world must follow. To be sure, U.S. policy sought to extend safeguards that would enable the IAEA to detect clandestine diversion of fissionable materials from reactors. Yet the IAEA guidelines applied only to those who voluntarily accepted them. There was little effort to discourage those countries which never accepted IAEA inspection from deliberately, openly developing a weapons capability. Even among those governments accepting IAEA inspection, some might still attempt to develop weapons at the risk of detection. Discovery by the IAEA of a violation of the treaty would not prevent governments from gaining a weapons capability because there was no effective enforcement.

Indeed, as the following discussion of equity issues demonstrates, Carter's nonproliferation policies were sufficiently devoid of positive incentives that not one of the near-nuclear-weapon countries—those with the technological ability and inclination to obtain nuclear weapons—has joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty during the Carter presidency.

The second major component of U.S. nonproliferation policy sought to

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 611-612.

develop "an international regime of practices and institutions for governing the split atom that will be widely accepted as legitimate, equitable, and reasonable. . . ."[18] As indicated above, U.S. policy was based on voluntary adherence to nonproliferation goals. For any society to join a nonproliferation regime voluntarily, or to remain in such a regime after accepting it, one ingredient is essential: equity. Officials recognized this in theory. But their policies denied it in practice.

The Carter administration, like its predecessors, based nonproliferation policies on inequity. The United States continued to upgrade and enlarge its nuclear arsenal while denying one to others. The United States refused to submit to the full-scope safeguards that it asked India and other countries to accept. In addition, the United States sought to restrict the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium to a handful of nuclear-weapons countries and their industrially advanced friends, meanwhile requiring countries with low consumption of energy per capita to be dependent for nuclear fuel on those countries with high energy consumption per capita. U.S. officials have never offered to consider all fissionable materials part of the common heritage of humanity, as public goods to be under the control of public authorities representing the planet's population, all of whom are affected by the use of nuclear materials.

The final component of U.S. policies for nonproliferation has been "...to reduce any security or prestige motives that states might have to develop nuclear explosives."[19] By their behavior, officials also have consistently undermined this goal. Obviously, the United States insists on retaining and upgrading its own nuclear weapons for reasons of both security and prestige. This insistence intensifies other governments' desires for nuclear technology.

Nowhere is the U.S. stimulation of worldwide procurement of nuclear weapons more pronounced than in officials' constant reaffirmation of the utility of weapons in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. U.S. officials underscore the legitimacy of nuclear arms whenever they rely on them diplomatically, build more of them, and claim that nuclear arms produce benefits for the United States which could not otherwise be obtained.

The carefully prepared statement of Secretary Harold Brown on the U.S. military posture illustrates the point. Not to be militarily number one, says Brown, would put the United States in "a position of weakness" where we would "...become a nation with more of a past than a future. This nation must remain the strongest in the world." Such a posture "...the President and I believe to be right and necessary for the security of our country."[20] Similarly,

---

18. *Ibid.*, p. 602.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 611.
20. Harold Brown (fn. 8), p. 14.

President Carter chastized Congress for cutting previous presidents' military budgets by more than $50 billion over the last twelve years. He insisted that the United States must be "second to none in military strength."[21]

Secretary Brown has emphasized that "nuclear weapons...have political significance...." Even though the Soviet Union can do nothing to prevent the United States from destroying Soviet society in war, the United States needs more weapons, he argued, to insure that "...every nation perceives that the United States cannot be coerced or intimidated by Soviet forces. Otherwise the Soviets could gain in the world, and we lose, not from war, but from change in perceptions...."[22] Secretary of State Cyrus Vance also proclaimed that political influence depends on military strength and the will to use it.[23] Brown's and Vance's declarations are at odds with Nye's statement that U.S. policy is designed "...not to reinforce any notion that being a nuclear weapons state provides unusual privileges or position in international affairs."[24] If officials claim that a society as economically strong and industrially advanced as the United States is able to reap benefits from possessing nuclear weapons, does this not encourage people in poor countries to believe that they could acquire some rewards from having their own nuclear weapons?

The depth of U.S. resistance to nuclear equity is illustrated by U.S. refusal to take the reasonable first step toward establishing a serious nonproliferation policy: a complete halt of nuclear tests. A comprehensive test ban treaty with the Soviet Union has been nearly completed for months, but never finalized because the Pentagon refuses to give up the "right" to test weapons. Despite the enormous technological lead the United States has over those countries that U.S. officials have asked not to test, the United States conducted 12 known tests in 1977, 10 in 1978, and 15 in 1979.[25] During the time when the strongly anti-nuclear prime minister Morarji Desai was in office, the United States failed even to respond to India's offer to give up nuclear weapons in exchange for an agreement from the superpowers to ban all nuclear tests and terminate production of fissionable materials.

---

21. Carter (fn. 5), p. 36A.

22. Brown (fn. 8), pp. 68-69.

23. Cyrus Vance, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Our Broader Strategy," testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 29, 1980, *Current Policy*, No. 153, United States Department of State (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p.4.

24. Nye (fn. 16), p. 620.

25. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Armaments or Disarmament? The Crucial Choice* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1979), p. 655; *Disarmament Times*, March-April, 1980, p. 1.

Unwilling to take any serious measure to reverse their own buildup and sophistication of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have proposed an international treaty that would outlaw "radiological weapons." Such weapons, which could be made from the spent fuel rods of reactors, destroy and kill by spreading radioactive materials without a nuclear explosion. The superpowers object to these weapons because they are easy to make. If Kremlin and White House officials could have their way, only weapons too complicated for less industrialized societies would be allowed. U.S. and Soviet leaders believe that it should be considered an international crime even to *possess* non-explosive radioactive weapons for deterrence. But it should remain legal to possess bombs and warheads for deterrence. It should be made a crime to destroy property or harm anyone by spreading radioactive materials without an explosion. But it should remain legal to destroy and kill with an explosion. Official hypocrisy would be ludicrous were it not tragic in its consequences.

U.S. Ambassador Adrian Fisher justified the proposed treaty because "...of the continuing proliferation of radioactive materials." Viktor Israelyan of the Soviet Union said the accord could protect people against "one of the possible new weapons of mass destruction" which might be as serious as bombs themselves.[26]

U.S. nonproliferation policies have failed to strengthen and increase support for a nonproliferation regime. Indeed U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons and export of nuclear power have undermined such a regime. Until the United States takes serious steps to abolish nuclear weapons and initiates a process to abolish the institution of war, its nonproliferation efforts cannot succeed. As the chief architect of a largely ineffective anti-proliferation policy himself once proclaimed: "We have little right to ask others to deny themselves nuclear weapons... unless we demonstrate meaningful progress toward the goal of control, then reduction, and ultimately, elimination of nuclear arsenals."[27]

Arms Exports

The international arms trade directly contributes to the worldwide growth of military influence and inclination to rely on arms for domestic repression and the conduct of diplomacy. Nearly all wars since 1945 have been fought in Third World countries with conventional weapons supplied by the industrialized, arms-producing states. During the early 1970's, the sale of aircraft, missiles, armed vehicles, and warships to Third World countries rose, on the average, by

26. *New York Times*, July 11, 1979.

27. Jimmy Carter (fn. 1), p. 11.

15 percent each year. From 1974 to 1978 this growth accelerated to 25 percent per year. Of the total arms trade, NATO countries sold 70 percent and members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization 27 percent.[28]

Responding to this trend during his campaign for the presidency and soon after taking office, Jimmy Carter spoke strongly and convincingly about the need to curtail arms sales for both humanitarian and security reasons. "I am particularly concerned," he said, "by our nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman." He criticized those officials who "try to justify this unsavory business on the cynical grounds that by rationing out the means of violence we can somehow control the world's violence."[29]

Carter emphasized arms exports as one of the points where his administration would differ sharply from the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years. After assuming office, he ordered a study of how to curtail the international arms trade. His call for a new policy was based on his belief that "the virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world." Of the $20 billion annual arms sales by all countries, "...the United States accounts for more than one half.... Because we dominate the world market to such a degree," he declared, "I believe that the United States can and should take the first step." The reduction of arms sales, he said, was a "necessity."[30] President Carter promised to limit the export of arms to "...an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests." He laid down four guidelines to make his policies a genuine departure from the past.[31]

The President began with a promise that the United States would reduce the total volume of its weapons sales below the preceding year for at least several years. The administration left many loopholes in the new policy, however, and allowed numerous exceptions to all guidelines. Officials did not apply the fiscal ceilings, for example, to arms sales to seventeen U.S. allies, to the provision of military services to any buyers, to the sale of military items used for construction of bases and military facilities, and to sales made through commercial channels. As a result, there have been declining ceilings and simultaneously

28. SIPRI (fn. 25), pp. 8-9.

29. Quoted in Max Holland, "The Myth of Arms Restraint," *International Policy Report*, Vol. 5 (May 1979), p. 2.

30. *New York Times*, May 8, 1977.

31. Unless otherwise noted, the direct quotations from the President's statement on arms exports are taken from Bernard Weinraub, "Broad Carter Policy Will Restrict Sales of Weapons Abroad," *New York Times*, May 20, 1977.

rising sales. By fiscal 1979, the ceiling applied to less than one-half of the total volume of arms sales.[32]

The size, scope, and level of sophistication of U.S. arms sales have continued at levels comparable to those reached during the Nixon-Ford years. Because of the administration's ingenious ways of calculating arms sales, estimates vary somewhat on the dollar value of total exports. After a detailed study of Carter's policies, Michael Klare concluded that U.S. arms exports rose by 20 percent during the first two years of the Carter administration. U.S. military exports reached record levels in 1979.[33] In the spring of 1980, officials laid plans to increase arms shipments to Saudi Arbia and Egypt, and perhaps also to Somalia and Sudan. More weapons were offered to the military dictatorship in Pakistan. Military transport and communications equipment will be sold to China. On the basis of contracts signed for future deliveries, arms exports are expected to rise in the years ahead.

Iran canceled about $12 billion worth of orders after its revolution in 1979. If all Iranian orders both before and after the revolution are excluded from the figures on the Middle East, arms exports to other countries in the region increased by 141 percent between fiscal 1977 (the last budget year prepared by the Ford administration) and fiscal 1980.[34] After taking inflation into account (and again excluding Iranian purchases) Max Holland reports that "arms exports to 98 percent of the Third World market will increase more than 85 percent from fiscal 1977 to fiscal 1980."[35] Well into the fourth year of the Carter administration, the United States continued to sell far more armaments than any other country—almost twice as much as the Soviet Union, the second largest supplier. The values implicit in officials' behavior contradicted their professed values. The meaning of this contradiction had earlier been clear to Jimmy Carter: "Our stand for peace is suspect if we are also the principal arms merchant of the world."[36]

President Carter's second guideline was a commitment that the United States would not be the first supplier to introduce into a region advanced weapons which would create a significantly higher combat capability. On the basis of this

32. Edward C. Luck, "The Born-again U.S. Arms Trade," *UNA-USA Interim Report* (April 1980), p. 3.

33. Michael T. Klare, "The Arms Overstock," *Harper's*, (November 1979), p. 24.

34. This calculation uses the Pentagon's estimate for sales during fiscal 1980. See Holland (fn. 29), p. 1.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union," text in *New York Times*, January 20, 1978.

principle, U.S. officials rejected requests from Ecuador, India, Guatemala, and Taiwan to purchase aircraft. On the other hand, only one month after Carter announced this policy, he waived it because of "extraordinary circumstances" which, he claimed, provided a security justification for selling highly sophisticated AWACS radar planes to the Shah of Iran. The Air Force pressed hard for this sale to reduce the burden of cost overruns on its own purchases of similar equipment.

A second breach of this provision, which signaled to the rest of the world that business would proceed as usual, was the decision to sell F-15 and F-16 fighters to Israel and Saudi Arabia for a total package worth $4.4 billion. This sale clearly increased Israel's existing air superiority, and then countered it with the sale to Saudi Arabia.

Carter's third guideline unequivocally promised: "Development . . . of advanced weapons systems solely for export will not be permitted." Yet early in 1980 President Carter decided to manufacture a new fighter, the FX, exclusively for export.[37] Earlier, the administration had already violated the spirit of this guideline in approving the sale of Northrop F-53/F jet fighters.[38]

The new Carter policy announced a similarly blunt fourth provision: "Coproduction agreements for significant weapons, equipment and major components are prohibited." On the basis of this guideline the administration rejected Israeli requests to coproduce the F-16 fighter. On the other hand, officials approved coproduction of two hydrofoil craft and undertook negotiations to assist in fitting Israeli avionics into the F 16's that Israel bought from the United States. Carter also waived this provision in allowing South Korea's co-assembly of 68 Northrop F-5 aircraft.

In assessing U.S. policies on arms exports, the professed value of restricting sales in order to increase security and respect human rights seemed clear. But the values implicit in U.S. behavior stand in sharp contrast. Leslie Gelb, who as Director of Political-Military Affairs in the Department of State helped carry out Carter's arms control policies, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after he left government service: the effect of Carter's policy for arms exports ". . . was to open a gap between rhetoric and practice that would undermine much of what he was trying to accomplish." Official ". . . rhetoric promised a revolution in the United States approach to arms transfers," while "the practice constituted a few modest modifications of past performance, but essentially continued a large-scale sales program."[39] Gelb's successor, Reginald

37. *New York Times*, January 5, 1980.

38. Holland (fn. 29), p. 14.

39. For a revealing discussion of arms export policies, see Leslie A. Gelb, "United States Arms Transfer Policies," statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 4, 1980, mimeographed.

Bartholomew, explained that the frequent compromise of the Carter guidelines "...gives us needed flexibility to make transfers in our national interest and to respond to changing circumstances by specifically providing the possibility of Presidential exceptions."[40] Although the Carter administration did reject requests for arms purchases which probably would have been accepted in previous administrations, business continued almost as usual. The biggest change was the continuation of massive exports under the guise of restricting it.

Arms sales remained very high during the Carter administration for three reasons. First, the guidelines, even if fully implemented, discriminated against less industrialized countries. The United States intended to enlarge and further sophisticate its own arsenal. Moreover, U.S. allies were excepted from the restrictive guidelines, even though they had less need to purchase abroad than most of the Third World, since the former could far more easily produce their own weapons. The discriminatory quality of this policy undermined restraint for two reasons. First, in the absence of concomitant U.S. efforts to help increase the political power of the less developed nations in international decision-making, the U.S. prevented the economically weak countries from extricating themselves from the second class citizenship that caused much international tension and resort to arms. Second, precisely because U.S. policy was discriminatory, it could not elicit the support from the purchasers of equipment which would be required to make the policy successful. Obviously, a U.S. effort to reduce the international trade in arms could work only if such a policy enjoyed the voluntary compliance of most purchasers so they would not turn to alternative suppliers or develop an indigenous capacity to produce arms.

Second, the Carter administration's policies did not lead toward its articulated goal because officials developed no effective policies to stop or rechannel the strong economic incentives for continuing arms sales. Instead, soon after the Shah's government collapsed and the new Iranian government canceled existing orders, President Carter sent Defense Secretary Harold Brown and General Ernest Graves of the Defense Security Assistance Agency on trips to find new arms customers. Such efforts were so successful that the Iranian cancellation of $10 to $12 billion worth of orders was almost completely offset by new purchases. The United States also continued to offer elaborate credit schemes to make arms purchases easier. The Treasury Department, for example, used the Federal Financing Bank to enable a country like the Philippines to pay less interest on a loan to buy U.S. jet fighters than it pays on a loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to purchase tractors.[41]

The Carter administration also refused to support legislation introduced by Senator George McGovern to provide planning, job retraining, and economic

40. Luck (fn. 32), p. 1.

41. Holland (fn. 29), p. 10.

assistance for converting industries which manufacture military equipment to other kinds of productivity. As a result, Carter failed to offset objections by corporations, unions, and the roughly 350,000 workers in the United States whose jobs depend on foreign military sales.[42] In addition, the Department of the Treasury wanted to keep military sales high in order to bring back to the United States petrodollars that had been flowing to the Persian Gulf. The Commerce Department wanted to increase U.S. exports to redress balance of payments difficulties. The Department of State wanted to retain strong ties and political influence with other countries through keeping them dependent on U.S. equipment.[43] The Department of Defense favored some sales in order to reduce the cost per unit of production for its own purchase of weapons.

Finally, the efforts to curb arms sales failed because for them to succeed probably required that they be made part of a comprehensive policy to take the first steps toward a genuine demilitarization of international relations. Officials showed no intention to pursue this goal. For example, the Carter administration demanded that Japan increase its military spending in order to increase the military power of U.S. allies without draining the U.S. treasury and, possibly, to make the Japanese yen less competitive against the dollar. Such requests have moved Japan toward militarization, despite Japan's constitutional prohibition against rearmament. Japan will now reconsider its decision not to make arms for export.[44] As Senator William Proxmire concluded after observing the implementation of the Carter policies, "we are seeing. . . a return to that old state of mind. In peace or during periods of tension, weapons are the answer."[45]

In 1976 and 1977 Carter clearly expressed the idea that arms exports lead to war and a decrease in security, both regionally and globally. By his words, President Carter declared that the United States could not be "both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war."[46] By his actions he has kept the United States the world's leading supplier.

---

42. Klare (fn. 33), p. 26.

43. Secretaries Vance and Brown both favored the sale to South Korea of F-16 fighters to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops, although President Carter decided against this advice. *New York Times,* November 26, 1978.

44. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball even suggested at a meeting of the Trilateral Commission that Japan build two aircraft carriers and lease them to the United States. Geoffrey Murray, "Nonmilitary Japan Considers Becoming An Arms Peddler," *Christian Science Monitor,* April 23, 1980, p. 6.

45. *Congressional Record,* March 27, 1979, p. S3424. Also quoted in Klare (fn. 33), p. 25.

46. Quoted in Holland (fn. 29), p. 9.

To be sure, it is expecting too much for the United States to halt sales if other suppliers rush to fill orders the United States turns down. But until the United States reduces its sales to the level of the Soviet Union, or NATO countries reduce their sales to the level of the Warsaw Pact, one must doubt that the security justification is more important than the profit motive and the effort to derive influence with other governments by affirming that arms are central to diplomacy and to governing, and that the purchase of U.S. arms will improve the quality of both.

Further doubt is cast on U.S. intentions by U.S. conduct during multilateral negotiations to encourage arms suppliers to exercise mutual self-restraint in order to prevent one country from filling an order that another has just declined. These negotiations collapsed in part because of U.S. opposition to the Soviet desire to discuss arms relationships with Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan, Iran, and the rest of the Persian Gulf.[47]

This brief examination of U.S. arms sales is instructive because it begins with such a clear statement of intention to increase security through reduced arms sales and decreased violence, but it ends with concrete behavior that undermines professed values. One must ask whether it would be better simply to admit that no substantial progress will be made in curtailing arms sales until officials remove the economic benefits of that trade, apply restrictions on arms first to the most heavily armed nations so as to redress the disproportionate power the heavily armed states now enjoy in world politics, and undertake a serious effort to establish an international regime for restricting arms universally and equitably, with the long-range goal of demilitarizing world society. Until these steps are taken, to restrict arms sales without restricting arms themselves discriminates against those without the capacity to produce. To restrict arms in one region but not in another is to help one's allies and hurt one's opponents, or the nonaligned, thereby destroying the universal cooperation that is required to make such a policy successful. The proliferation of both nuclear and conventional weapons will probably continue to occur until the United States halts its own buildup and reduces its heavy reliance on military power for the conduct of diplomacy.

Intervention

The Carter administration sought, as a fifth goal, to avoid situations similar to the Vietnam war and, more generally, to restrain international military competition and limit U.S. military involvements throughout the world. In internal wars where the Soviet Union was not involved, Carter said, "I can't envision any circumstances under which I would send troops."[48] It was less easy, of

47. Luck (fn. 32), p. 3.

48. Jimmy Carter, "Excerpts from the Interview with Carter on His Concepts in Foreign Policy," *New York Times,* July 7, 1976.

course, to define more modest forms of involvement, such as covert intervention or the provision of arms. Nonetheless, because he took office during the height of public disenchantment with U.S. clandestine and overt operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and elsewhere, President Carter did keep the United States from any large-scale involvements.

The longer that members of the Carter administration have exercised the power of the presidency, the less willing they have been to honor President Carter's promise strictly to restrain the activities of the CIA. Officials began backpedaling on this promise as soon as they had a stake in disguising the use of power in their own administration. For example, only one month after taking office, President Carter, Secretary Vance, and CIA Director Stansfield Turner all publicly argued that it was proper for the CIA to pass money secretly to officials of other governments. Turner called secret CIA payments to heads of governments "foreign aid, in secrecy," and "a very legitimate tool of foreign policy."[49] Carter expressed deep concern about such CIA activities being revealed to the public. It could be "extremely damaging" to national security, he said, "for these kinds of operations which are legitimate and proper to be revealed."[50] Time and again during his campaign in 1976 Carter pleaded for a foreign policy as decent as the American people. Yet even though the U.S. Constitution names bribery as grounds for impeachment of a president, Carter's sense of decency after he became president enabled him publicly to defend bribes as long as they were made to other presidents and prime ministers.

Preparations to increase the U.S. capacity for overt intervention abroad paralleled the efforts to deny the public information about expanded CIA political operations. The U.S. security goal for the Indian Ocean in 1977 had been to demilitarize it through formal agreement. By 1979 the Carter administration was seeking to establish permanent U.S. naval facilities at Diego Garcia. More recently, in part spurred by what Secretary Brown called "international turbulence," the Pentagon has completed new surveys of sites for military facilities at Masira off the coast of Oman, in Berbera, Somalia, and Mombasa, Kenya. All governments agreed to give U.S. access.[51] Officials have actively discussed new bases in Israel and Egypt.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's National Security Adviser with a compulsion to "get over" the post-Vietnam reluctance to use military power, advocated a rapid response interventionary force in mid-1977 to extend a military

49. Stansfield Turner, "Interview on 'Face the Nation,' " CBS Television, March 20, 1977, mimeographed.

50. Carter's comments were reported in the *New York Times*, February 24, 1977.

51. Richard Burt, "Indian Ocean Lands Reported to Agree to U.S. Use of Bases," *New York Times*, February 12, 1980.

umbrella over the Persian Gulf. At that time the State Department opposed the idea on grounds that such an interventionary unit would be politically provocative. But further initiatives to create this force did not wait for the turmoil in Afghanistan and Iran in late 1979. In January of that year Secretary of Defense Harold Brown reported that "planning is going ahead" for such a force.[52]

In his 1980 State of the Union message President Carter pronounced the death of the post-Vietnam reluctance to threaten war: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. . . and will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[53] Bringing the interventionary use of force to the foreground of U.S. policy, Carter applied a colonial age Monroe Doctrine to a post colonial Middle East. A great military power announced that it reserves the right unilaterally to determine when to use its armed forces in other countries even though those countries did not participate in the decision or the announcement. For the first time in history, U.S. officials described as self-defense the use of force to maintain access to the natural resources of another country.

The Carter administration has refused to define the "outside force" which would trigger the Carter Doctrine. It clearly would include a Soviet invasion, but for an act so obvious it would not require a new doctrine. Nor would the rapid deployment force, even if doubled in size, be sufficient to prevent or repel a determined Soviet invasion close to its own territory. The question inevitably arises whether officials intend to use such a force primarily to intervene in civil wars or domestic unrest in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Third World leaders will recall that in 1965, under the Johnson Doctrine, U.S. officials defined as an outside force all indigenous citizens with an alien ideology. At that time, the United States sent marines to the Dominican Republic. In his rationale for the use of an interventionary force, Secretary Brown included the possibility that the growth of indigenous nationalism might compromise U.S. oil interests in the Middle East.[54]

Just as the Carter Doctrine raised the prospect of U.S. intervention in conflicts of primarily internal origin, so it also suggested that possible U.S. intervention was more closely tied to maintaining U.S. prosperity than to preventing military threats to the U.S. public. As Secretary Vance explained, "With an inescapable stake in the health of the international economy we can-

52. *Washington Post*, January 2, 1979.

53. *New York Times*, January 21, 1980.

54. *Washington Post*, January 2, 1979.

not idly watch vital resources fall under the control of an outside force."[55] Secretary Brown acknowledged that the United States could get along without consuming much of the petroleum that makes the U.S. dependent on Persian Gulf oil but to do so would hurt the U.S. economy.[56] Officials thus are undertaking serious preparations to go to war in order to protect access to foreign oil which the United States could do without, but chooses not to in order to maintain a high level of prosperity. Drivers in U.S. society, which contains less than 6 percent of the world's population, consume 50 percent of the gasoline that is burned in all automobiles throughout the entire world. Officials and most citizens value this level of consumption more than they value the avoidance of war or the achievement of global equity.

One can expect this same value hierarchy to guide officials' clandestine operations, only with even more intense attention to narrow nationalist goals and the vested interests of policymakers and their immediate supporters. We will never know, of course, as much about these policies. We do know, however, that the United States did have embassy personnel in Teheran planning with Iranians to undertake a *coup* should other Iranians supporting the Ayatollah Ruholleh Khomeini attempt to form a government. Despite the best efforts of U.S. Air Force General Robert E. Huyser in Teheran, the rapid disintegration of Iran's military forces made the plans simply unworkable before they could be carried out.[57]

Before the public had any knowledge of this recent U.S. effort to intervene in Iran's domestic politics, and while public resentment soared against the illegal holding of U.S. diplomats hostage, the White House approached members of Congress to win support for lifting restrictions on the CIA. The Carter administration sought to repeal the Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974, which was pointedly written to prevent the CIA from doing in secret the acts that officials would be reluctant to carry out if they were required to report fully to members of Congress. At the same time that the Carter administration wanted to step up the number of covert activities, it wanted less Congressional oversight. One such activity included arming anti-Soviet Moslem guerrillas in Afghanistan with Soviet-made assault rifles. Limited U.S. assistance went to the guerrillas even before the Soviet invasion.[58] This U.S. support doubtless was not the deciding reason for the Soviet invasion, but it probably encouraged the Soviet calculations that justified the use of their armed forces there.

---

55. Vance (fn. 23), p. 4.

56. Brown (fn. 8), p. 4.

57. *New York Times*, April 20, 1980.

58. Tad Szulc, "Putting Back the Bite in the C.I.A.," *New York Times Magazine*, April 6, 1980, p. 28.

Once again, Carter's behavior in office differed sharply from his opening attitude and professed values. At first he ordered his aides to cooperate with the Select Committee on Intelligence in drafting a CIA charter, legislation that would for the first time clearly spell out the limitations on the CIA's operations. Later, Carter and his aides abandoned this idea entirely. In its place, one of the administration's prime goals became to authorize the president to determine when Congress should be informed of covert operations. In general, members of Congress have kept CIA secrets better than members of the executive branch. Nonetheless, the president and his aides believed that simply the requirement to discuss covert operations with members of Congress prevents the CIA from undertaking some actions.[59] Such a result, of course, could be a positive argument on behalf of oversight.

No changes in the efficiency or scrupulousness of agency work justified the administration's new confidence in the agency nor the growing support in Congress and among the public for "unleashing" the CIA. In fact, officials testified during Congressional hearings that they had already terminated the internal ban on the use of U.S. journalists, clergymen, and academics for covert operations—without informing Congress at the time. The shift in attitude seemed due to a desire to enable the United States to use force with fewer restrictions and without the embarrassment of officials assuming responsibility for their own actions. Moreover, the public seemed to want the CIA's "dirty tricks" to be committed without their knowledge, so citizens in a professedly self-governing society could feel they also had escaped responsibility for overseas assassinations, bribes, electoral frauds, and *coups*.

With the support of the Carter administration on many points, Senator Daniel Moynihan and six other senators introduced legislation to exempt the CIA from complying with most provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Their bill would also make it a crime for any official or former official to make public the name of any intelligence agent or informant. The government could even bring criminal charges against private citizens for revealing names of agents if it could be construed that they did so "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."[60] In addition to greatly reducing the number of congressional committees receiving information from the CIA, the legislation allows the CIA to carry out some activities without informing Congressional oversight committees in advance and possibly at all.[61]

To summarize, during the past four years the United States has substantially increased the number, sophistication, and destructive capability of its strategic

59. *Ibid*, p. 62.

60. *New York Times*, January 25, 1980.

61. *New York Times*, Feburary 12, 1980.

and tactical nuclear weapons. The SALT II treaty, even if ratified, would have done little to reverse this buildup, or the major new thrust under way. The United States now prepares to extend its military presence further into Southwest Asia and China, while hoping to resist a decline of military influence elsewhere. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, in practice officials have forsaken the goals of reducing military expenditures, of halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, of reducing arms exports, of confining intelligence activities primarily to collection of information under strict congressional oversight, and of resisting preparations for intervention in Third World societies.

2. The Values Guiding U.S. Policymakers

Table IV compares officials' professed values to the values they expressed in their behavior.

Table IV

Summary Comparison of U.S. Officials' Professed and Implicit Values on Security Issues, 1977-80

Values Professed in Rhetoric	Values Expressed in Behavior
— to reduce military spending	— to increase military expenditures
— to take steps toward the elimination of nuclear arms	— to increase U.S. nuclear arms, without regard for stimulating the arms buildup
	— to adopt a less stable but offensively stronger nuclear posture and strategic doctrine
— to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries while retaining the right for the U.S. to possess nuclear weapons	— to upgrade the U.S. arsenal
	— to offer one-sided proposals for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, even if this means the spread of nuclear weapons technology

Table IV (cont.)

	— to seek allies or to offset Soviet military influence through the export of weapons-usable fuel and technology
— to reduce U.S. arms exports	— to expand anti-Soviet or pro-U.S. sympathies in other governments, to recycle petro-dollars, to maintain access to oil, and to aid the U.S. economy through arms sales, even if these actions stimulate the militarization of the planet
— to refrain from interventions in Third World countries	— to prepare to intervene against Soviet-backed forces and anti-U.S. indigenous groups in order to maintain access to oil and avert loss of political influence that would adversely affect the U.S. economy
— to restrict covert actions by the CIA	— to make it easier for the CIA to conduct covert actions
	— to reduce Congressional oversight of the CIA
	— to gain authority for the President to refrain from informing Congress about some covert actions

In most cases the value tradeoffs realized in U.S. policy contradicted the value priorities of what I have called the human interest.[62] In general, in the policy areas examined above, officials of the Carter administration valued:

power more than security;
military forms of power more than nonmilitary forms;
uninhibited exercise of national power more than global coordination of policy;

62. For elaboration of this concept see Johansen (fn. 3), pp. 20-23.

profit more than security;
profit more than restraint in arms exports;
deference to domestic economic and political pressures more than defusing arms competition with the Soviet Union;
high oil consumption more than peace;
peace more than justice based on equity;
nuclear weapons superiority more than a nuclear weapons freeze;
nuclear weapons competition more than nuclear non-proliferation; and
maintenance of overseas political influence more than respect for the principle of non-intervention in other countries' domestic politics.

The reason that U.S. officials and academic experts have failed to take substantial strides toward a world of greater peace and justice can be simply stated. Their worldview or "operational code" has been unrealistically narrow and drastically restricted. It has been partial in two senses: inclined to favor one party more than another, and focused on one part of a problem rather than the whole. Each of these two defects helps explain why Carter's behavior departed so far from his rhetoric. First, officials served their own vested interests and those of the powerful groups who supported their government, thus inevitably falling short of honoring their generally humanitarian, egalitarian rhetoric and reciprocal rights among nations. Second, their uncomprehensive analysis of problems meant that they never considered structural solutions even when problems had structural causes. Their political interests and worldview dictated that reformation of existing institutions and policies would be sufficient, and that transformation of the international system was both unnecessary and undesirable. In brief, the Carter administration, like its predecessors, has been concerned with one kind of security rather than its many dimensions, one type of power (military) rather than all forms of power, a small part of the future rather than as much future time as possible, and with one part of humanity rather than all people.[63] The prevailing approach excludes policy goals and means which were perhaps impractical or unfeasible for nineteenth century diplomacy, but which now are possible and necessary if the species is to survive with dignity.

Table V summarizes important differences between the orientation that has guided U.S. policy and an alternative orientation aiming to realize the values selected to define the human interest. Officials' professed values were not utilized as standards for rationally ordering policy alternatives and selecting the most promising one for value realization. As a result, the values themselves became discredited as unrealizable. Potential public pressure to reorient policy was weakened by the favorable disguise with which officials clothed the less

63. For empirical documentation of this point, see Johansen (fn. 3), pp. 364-87.

Table V

Summary Comparison of Policy Orientations on Security Issues

	1	2
	Prevailing approach	**Proposed approach**
	U.S. policy	**The human interest**
Object of dominant concern:	state or national government	people
Basic value:	maintenance or accumulation of power	fulfillment of human needs
Primary means for value realization:	traditional diplomacy backed by increasing military power	creating equitable instruments of and expanding the use of non-military power while constricting the use of military power
Beneficiary of value realization:	decision-making elite and its supporters	all people throughout the world
Duration of value realization:	0-4 years	present and long-run future

desirable values they in fact implemented. Whether one believes that officials were unable or unwilling to take an alternative approach in harmony with preferred values, it should be understood that their behavior has impeded the implementation of feasible alternatives to much of today's violence and injustice.

3. An Alternative U.S. Foreign Policy

If one is committed to making substantial progress toward realizing the values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance

throughout the world, then the preceding analysis demonstrates the inadequacy of the prevailing policy approach, which is described in column 1 of Table V. Furthermore, my hypothesis is that policy based on the orientation in column 2 is more consistent with and likely to achieve the four primary values. These values and the attributes of the proposed approach (column 2) suggest the following guidelines for making policy choices.

Guidelines

1. The central security problem of our age is the inclination of governments to threaten or use military force to insist upon having their own way. The main security problem is not, as most officials believed, insuring that the United States maintains at least as much conventional and nuclear firepower as the Soviet Union. The United States remains the strongest military power in the world, and it is stronger than at any time in its history. Yet it is not secure against immediate and virtually total destruction, on the one hand, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan on the other. The number one security problem also is not, as some fear, a failure of will. Possessing one, two, or more rapid deployment forces, and the willingness to use them, could not prevent a determined Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or Iran. Nor would an even more freely operating CIA be likely to return U.S. hostages from Teheran alive.

If the central security problem is the excessive willingness of governments to rely on military power to settle conflicts, then the main purpose of security policy should be to reduce the role of military power in human affairs.

Given this goal, the United States cannot increase its security in the long run merely by opposing the Soviet Union militarily, even in those cases where the Soviet Union undermines achievement of peace by its military behavior. To increase security, the United States must oppose and constrict the use of military power in all diplomacy, even its own. By its reliance on military strength for much of its diplomacy (not to mention its combat), the United States on balance does far more to legitimize the role of military power than to delegitimize it. Officials' preoccupation with being militarily number one, or second to none, illustrates not only how legitimate we believe military power to be but also our belief that without so much of it we would be a less responsible member of the international community. Thus U.S. foreign policy is not merely a failure in the effort to build a nonviolent world, it constitutes a strongly negative force.

Officials and other critics of this conclusion claim that the United States maintains great military power so that, by deterring war, the armed forces will not be needed often in combat. Yet the use of military strength in diplomacy short of war legitimizes its diplomatic use nonetheless. In addition, the influence

of armed strength in diplomacy can be maintained only by using such strength occasionally in war. As the statements of Vance and Brown (quoted above) indicate, the United States does use its military power diplomatically. This is the basis for the claim that the possession of military might makes its use in war less likely. Yet this use of armed capability in diplomacy to help a government get its way is the fundamental problem.

To resist an abuse of military power with countervailing military power may buy time to start all over again to find a nonmilitary solution to a security problem, but countervailing military power can never be part of the solution itself. To threaten the Soviet Union with U.S. attack if its troops move from Afghanistan into Iran may scare Soviet officials enough that the troops stay in their barracks, but the threat by the U.S. legitimizes and increases the role of military power in diplomacy. The Carter Doctrine, promising a unilateral U.S. decision to intervene in some cases, adds to the overall security problem in Southwest Asia by confirming that the threat or use of force is a reliable and legitimate instrument of conflict resolution. Even if this policy is temporarily successful in resisting a Soviet advance, it cannot reduce military influence in international relations.

But, skeptics might ask, does not the U.S. threat against further Soviet advances strengthen the norm against all uses of force except those undertaken in self-defense? Unfortunately, in the absence of any impartial and universally accepted global authority to define when force is used in self-defense, the threat to use force against military aggression still reinforces the idea that force may be used as an instrument of foreign policy. (Even the United States stood on the principles of self-defense in sending troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 and to Vietnam from 1965 to 1974.)

The preceding points are illustrated in Table VI, which shows the most likely outcomes of various Soviet responses to U.S. threats to use military power in resisting a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Four examples demonstrate that existing policies are likely to produce one of two outcomes: (1) nuclear war, or (2) recurring use of threats which will re-stimulate the arms buildup periodically and indefinitely. Even the outcomes which prevent the occupation of Afghanistan do not increase security because the arms competition will continue and the dominant incentives—for both Moscow and Washington—encourage either using threats or preparing to use them in the future. The people of Afghanistan, from this perspective, are relatively insignificant, as indeed they have been in official policy calculations on both sides.

There are, of course, other possibilities, but they are unlikely. In the midst of scenario 1, for example, U.S. and Soviet leaders might become so frightened that they suddenly decide to shift to the alternative policy approach proposed

Table VI

The Impact of Nuclear Threats on National Security

Hypothetical Context: To stop the movement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, U.S. officials threaten to use military force, including nuclear weapons, unless Soviet leaders immediately halt the invasion and withdraw all Soviet military personnel. Four sets of outcomes, based on whether U.S. officials are bluffing or genuinely willing to use nuclear weapons, are instructive:

U.S. officials' position on the use of nuclear weapons	Soviet action	Outcomes
1. are bluffing	back down	— USSR abandons invasion — arms race intensifies* — future nuclear threats are encouraged** — leads in another context to repetition of scenario 1 or to scenario 2, 3, or 4
2. will use	back down	— USSR abandons invasion — arms race intensifies* — future nuclear threats are encouraged** — leads in another context to repetition of scenario 2 or to scenario 4
3. are bluffing	go ahead	— USSR occupies Afghanistan — arms buildup intensifies*** — the calling of bluffs and "non-bluffs" assumed to be bluffs is encouraged — leads in another context to repetition of scenario 3 or to scenario 4
4. will use	go ahead	— nuclear war

*Soviet leaders are determined not to be intimidated again.

**U.S. will be tempted to repeat the "successful" use of threat. USSR will be tempted to use a similar threat when in a stronger position.

***U.S. officials fear that they need more military power to stop the Soviet Union. Soviet officials assume that their local military preponderance was the reason for "success."

here. Such crisis learning may occur, but one would be foolish to wait for it or attempt to plan it. In fact, we know that after the Cuban missile crisis officials showed no inclination to decrease their reliance on military power. Despite clear evidence that we were very close to nuclear war over a relatively minor issue (since Soviet missiles could be closer to U.S. shores in Soviet submarines than in Cuba anyway), citizens and diplomats alike hailed President John Kennedy for his successful statesmanship. Nikita Khrushchev, perhaps the more reasonable of the two in this instance, was eventually ousted from office by Kremlin hardliners who planned large new missile deployments outside of Cuba.

Scenarios 1 and 3 lead either to their own repetition, or, if one actor imitates the "successful," more rigid stance of its opponent, to scenario 4, which is nuclear war. Thus 3 out of 4 of these chains of events carry a serious possibility of nuclear war. This illustrates why deterrence may appear stable in the short run, but in the long run is unstable. For it to succeed there must be a positive probability of its failure.

2. From the preceding discussion it follows that, in the nuclear age, the most important security battles are over the location of normative boundaries, not territorial ones. To constrict gradually the code of conduct governing what constitutes legitimate use of force is the most important battle to wage. This is more important than arms control or disarmament on the one hand, or matching new Soviet throw-weight on the other. The most effective means for establishing preferred rules and procedures are (1) nonmilitary incentives to encourage support from other governments and (2) one's own nonmilitary conduct. Military incentives, such as the threat or use of force to assure compliance, exacerbate the overall security problem.

3. To avoid failure, major policy initiatives should be carefully designed and executed to communicate clearly that the United States is *for* the establishment of a humane code of conduct for all governments, not *against* the particular policy goals that any given state may believe is necessary to protect its interests.

It is important to avoid U.S. reactions which reinforce the most negative Soviet patterns, such as meeting Moscow's introduction of military power in Southwest Asia with a new military presence of our own. U.S. policy toward Soviet intervention in Afghanistan could have been constructed so that it would readily have been recognized as in favor of the universal prohibition of the use of force rather than as anti-Soviet. All states which similarly opposed the use of force in Afghanistan could then have been encouraged to use the opportunity to sharpen the worldwide understanding of how to determine and specify in advance the impermissibility of similar incidents.

4. For incentives to be successful in establishing new rules of conduct against force, they must be undertaken with multilateral participation, including many

nonaligned states. This is essential to assure that the rules will reflect the broad interests of the world community.

5. Foreign policy should benefit all people—not merely states, the "national interest," or primarily the people in national governments and their immediate supporters. One test of whether a foreign policy can be successful in the 1980's is the extent to which it recognizes that in the nuclear age most traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs are breaking down. More and more actions by people on one side of a territorial border affect people on the other. For those people seeking to domesticate international relations, all wars are civil wars.

6. National security in itself is a misleading concept. Either there will be *human* security, involving many nations, or there will be insecurity. National military forces will be increasingly unable to defend against a determined attack by another nuclear superpower or even a small group of militant youths. Security in the future will be less closely related to military power than to dependable supplies of goods that fulfill human needs. Short of some form of imperial control of other lands, these vital resources cannot be guaranteed by military force, no matter how large the military budget becomes. An oilfield can be blown up without much more difficulty than taking U.S. diplomats hostage. Air and water can be fouled for centuries by a single deliberate or careless misuse of fissionable materials.

7. Since war avoidance depends on making the value of peace greater than the value of war for all actors with the potential for starting war, officials need to give far more attention to economic and political incentives that will increase the benefits of peace. This will give all actors a larger stake in war prevention. The more positive the benefits of peace, the more unsatisfactory war will appear if those benefits can be taken away when the threat or use of force occurs.

Nonmilitary, economic and political incentives can also help convince governments that there will be more costs than benefits from an arms buildup. Officials in many governments desire weapons because they are symbols of sovereignty and give governments more recognition and power in nonmilitary areas. This desire could be alternatively satisfied by granting small states greatly increased recognition and power within newly structured, more equitable economic and political institutions worldwide. Doing this, of course, would also produce the important side effect of requiring today's great military powers to give up, during the reform of global institutions, some of the special advantages they now hold because of their past military superiority. Although not easy to achieve, this result would leave presently privileged states with less need for military power to retain advantages that would be eliminated in an international system where might did not make right.

8. Given the interconnectedness and depth of today's problems, incremental policy innovation no longer makes sense unless it is tailored for and incorporated into a broad strategy for fundamentally changing the international code of conduct, people's attitudes that underpin it, and the global institutions that eventually will guard against the abuse of military power.

Applications

The practical utility of an alternative framework for policymaking can be tested in the real world. Would the people of the United States and the world be any closer to realizing preferred values, for example, if officials had used the proposed orientation for making policy choices toward Iran and Afghanistan?

Over the past three decades U.S. officials accomplished an amazing result in Iranian-U.S. relations. U.S. policies stimulated the leaders of a revolution inspired by religion and nationalism to become more anti-U.S. than anti-Soviet, despite the immediate threat of Soviet power on the Iranian northern border and the Soviet scorn for religious belief. If, in contrast, the proposed policy approach had guided U.S. policy toward Iran, it is unlikely that U.S. diplomats would have become hostages in the first place. Had U.S. officials been more concerned with people's needs than with state power, the CIA would not have staged an overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953 to install the Shah. Having never put him in power, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State would not have built up a dependent military dictatorship that steadily alienated more and more Iranians. Without that relationship, the anti-U.S. feelings would not have grown to the point that, once the Shah fled his own people, the new government would allow extremists to imprison U.S. diplomats.

After the hostages had been taken, the proposed approach also would have been more likely to free them speedily. If officials had emphasized the well-being of people on both sides of this conflict, they would have attempted to establish an international tribunal to hear whether allegations against the Shah were sufficient that he should stand trial for violations of legally-binding norms governing his behavior.[64] This could have been done to respect the rights of people in Iran, to insure that the Shah had a fairer trial than he might receive in Iran, and to nurture the growth of genuine respect for human rights for which

64. This section draws in part upon Richard Falk's early proposal for an international inquiry and possible trial. "Criminal Justice for the Shah and Peace for the World," mimeographed, 7 pp., November 28, 1979. For a provocative discussion of different perspectives on human rights as an international obligation, see Richard Falk, "Human Rights, Foreign Policy, and World Order," statement in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy Hearings* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 368-81.

the United States and most countries now express rhetorical support.

Rules of conduct need to be reaffirmed whenever challenged or violated, and it is for this purpose that an inquiry or trial could be held. Those persons who might be found guilty before an international tribunal certainly need not receive capital punishment. The purpose is not revenge against the wrongdoer but redress of injury for innocent victims of the past (where possible) and protection of them in the future.

The informal hearings in Teheran conducted by the UN-sponsored commission in March 1980, were perhaps a step in the right direction, but they lacked sufficient formal authority to set the needed human rights precedent for the future of the global community. They also appeared to be part of a political maneuver, a somewhat unprincipled move to the narrow ground between satisfying the conflicting political demands of the militants in Teheran and the politicians in Washington. It was not a judicial proceeding to render an impartial judgment in behalf of the world community to define and protect people's legitimate rights. The establishment of an international tribunal, where individuals even in absentia could be held accountable, would advance the cause of human rights an important step beyond the Nuremberg precedent. It would also probably do more to insure the safe release of the hostages than the U.S. refusal to discuss such an idea until after the hostages are released.

U.S. officials have wanted to make the point that the hostages should be returned regardless of the Shah's guilt or innocence. That is true. But the U.S. reluctance to have an authoritative hearing of Iranian grievances (as well as the refusal to apologize for U.S. illegalities in Iran) remains essentially a political act to show that U.S. pride, power, and prestige will not be compromised. In that sense, U.S. diplomats in Teheran are hostage not only to Iranian militants but also to the refusal of President Carter and the U.S. public to establish an impartial procedure to clarify the law of human rights that the Shah may have violated.

This step in transforming the international system is so desirable that U.S. citizens should seek to take it as an end in itself, even if diplomatic immunity had never been violated in Teheran. Since the violation occurred and the governments of the world initially came overwhelmingly to the defense of the hostages, officials had an excellent opportunity to find support for such a tribunal.

In addition to the history of U.S. cooperation with the Shah, there is a more subtle underlying reason why U.S. diplomats have been taken hostage. International law has imposed a very one-sided set of obligations.[65] It has served the in-

65. For an excellent discussion of the one-sidedness of international law in the Iranian case, see Richard Falk, "Geopolitics and Law: A Brief for New Rules," *Christianity and Crisis,* March 3, 1980, pp. 44-48.

terests of the powerful. For example, the law against violating diplomatic immunity is unambiguous, as a unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice has made clear. But there is less clarity of the law when it comes to embassy officials subverting the government of its host country, as the United States did in Iran in 1953. Subsequently, without any strict legal prohibitions, U.S. embassy personnel could help to establish, train, and arm the Iranian secret police that persecuted thousands of Iranian citizens.

The Carter administration explicitly took advantage of this one-sided legal tradition long before the ascendancy of Khomeini. In 1977, for example, Secretary Vance announced that where "the strategic situation is of critical importance," the United States would not allow human rights questions to curtail arms transfers.[66] Carter used the security argument to justify CIA collaboration with and the sale of sophisticated weapons to the Shah at an unprecedented rate, despite Amnesty International's report that Iran had one of the highest rates of death penalties in the world, consistently circumvented the use of civilian courts, and engaged in systematic torture. Moreover, "freedom of speech and association are non-existent."[67] Nonetheless, Carter praised the Shah for his leadership in maintaining a "strong, stable, and progressive Iran."[68]

U.S. diplomats were, in part, taken hostage by Iranians because, given the imbalance in U.S.-Iranian relations, less extreme tactics were unavailable to exert leverage against the Shah's most important ally. This does not make the taking of hostages right, but it makes it somewhat more understandable. A diplomacy inspired by the alternative framework would have laid the groundwork for sufficient international legal reform and equity to have made hostage-taking very unlikely.

The Afghan case is a tougher test for the proposed alternative framework. To formulate foreign policy on the basis of interests defined in terms of military power would seem at first to make sense because in this case we face the movement of thousands of Soviet troops across a well-recognized border to determine who will govern a previously non-aligned, although Marxist, government.

In applying the alternative approach, however, some new insights unfold. One becomes quickly aware that there was, prior to the announcement of the Carter Doctrine, no public discussion of the actual or anticipated impact of the Soviet involvement on the Afghan people. Indeed, during the many months that Afghan violence raged before the Soviet troops marched in, the United States showed little interest. The belatedness of U.S. concern suggests that it was an anti-Soviet competition for power rather than an effort to improve the quality

66. Cyrus Vance, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 76 (February 28, 1977), p. 164.

67. Amnesty International, *Iran*, Amnesty International Briefing, November 1976.

68. *New York Times*, November 16, 1977.

of life for Afghans that motivated U.S. officials. Simply to reflect on the human side would take some of the stridency out of U.S. reactions, despite the deplorable Soviet behavior. The Marxist government of Hofizullah Amin, who ruled before the Soviet invasion, practiced an authoritarianism contemptuous of Afghan traditions and Moslem beliefs. Indigenous resistance to it mounted until there was a full-scale insurgency. Presumably one reason for the Soviet intervention was to oust such an inept government. The new Soviet-backed government of Babrak Karmal may not turn out to be better than its predecessor on questions of civil and political liberties. But it is doubtful that it will be worse.

Perhaps the most serious problem is the Soviet violation of the principle of self-determination and the occupation of new territory. To encourage Soviet respect for Afghanistan's nonalignment, the Brzezinski-Carter approach has emphasized negative incentives such as the U.S. trade embargo against the Soviet Union and a growing U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, and China. The alternative approach would, first of all, not overlook, as did the Carter administration, the *positive* incentives which might have encouraged Soviet officials to restrain themselves from sending troops across their southern border. Because Washington was trying to maintain strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, well *before* the Soviet intervention occurred the Carter administration made the following decisions that directly destroyed incentives for Soviet self-restraint:

— to deploy the MX missile;

— to deploy a new generation of intermediate range nuclear missiles (Pershing IIs) and cruise missiles in Europe;

— to dismiss the Brezhnev proposal to withdraw Soviet troops and halt certain deployments if NATO would decline to deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe;

— to press all NATO countries to increase their real military expenditures by at least 3 percent annually; and

— to increase U.S. military expenditures by 25 percent beyond inflation over the next five years.

In addition, despite one concession by Carter after another to Senate hawks, the Senate appeared unable to ratify the SALT II treaty.

Advocates of moderation in the Kremlin felt that what they needed to ease the military rivalry between the two countries had been deliberately taken away by Carter, Brzezinski, and Congress. Confronted with the possibility of collapse by a Marxist government in Afghanistan and believing that the Western military

buildup would limit any future benefits from detente anyway, a number of Soviet leaders reportedly concluded that they had more to lose by allowing the deterioration in Afghanistan to continue than by intervening directly.

Second, Moscow would have felt less fear about the insurgency against a Marxist government in Afhanistan and less need for a buffer state on its southern border if there had been generally lower expectations for an intensified military rivalry with the United States. But given U.S. decisions during 1979 to manufacture more counterforce weapons and emplace cruise missiles in Europe, some Soviet officials believed that a show of toughness could communicate displeasure with the U.S. buildup and demonstrate that Moscow would not be intimidated by it. After the Soviet intervention, nothing could confirm the need for a hard line in Soviet minds more than the feeling that Washington was returning to a Cold War doctrine for international and domestic political reasons. Secretary Harold Brown seemed to provide that confirmation by announcing that the United States would begin to ship military-related items to China. The Soviet leaders saw further confirmation in granting China most-favored-nation trading status—which the Soviet Union never achieved.

Third, in using a policy framework emphasizing the needs of the people in Southwest Asia, it becomes clear that neither a Soviet nor a U.S. presence is desirable. The goal should be to exclude imperial power from the region altogether and to prohibit the presence of all outside national military forces.

The Soviet expansion in Afghanistan deplorably undercuts such a principle. Yet, should the United States also undermine the desired norm by expanding its own military presence? In contrast to Soviet behavior, the United States could publicly declare its intention to reduce the role of military power in the area by careful acts of demilitarization. Rather than extend U.S. political, military, and resource claims to the entire Persian Gulf region, as Carter and his aides have done, they could propose a nonintervention regime. They might offer to freeze all U.S. military deployments and bases against further expansion, promising not to send the armed forces into any nonaligned countries *even if invited,* in return for a Soviet commitment to exercise similar restraint. The United States could also offer to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, making it off limits for all armed naval vessels of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

These steps would lay the foundation for a fourth policy goal: to encourage cooperation among the states of the region for their own security and the exclusion of great military powers. For the U.S. president to rush to the Persian Gulf unfolding the U.S. military umbrella was precisely the wrong gesture to produce the desired regional collaboration. U.S. policy, which was sharply criticized by several Middle Eastern governments and favored by others, broke the initial consensus against outside military forces that was created by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The main beneficiary of Carter's announcement was his own

standing in the U.S. public opinion polls, not the people of the Middle East.

Ironically, the other major beneficiary has been the Soviet government. If President Carter has a right to intervene when "outside" forces threaten to "control" a Middle Eastern government, then the Soviet Union can make the same claim. Indeed, in Southwest Asia U.S. military advisers are more "outside" than their Soviet counterparts. Moreover, U.S. military bases and militarily-backed governments in the region will stimulate indigenous anti-U.S. feelings, as well as distract from the Soviet expansion. If the United States claims the right to step into a Persian Gulf nation when internal unrest threatens a pro-U.S. government, then the Soviet Union can make a similar claim to intervene on behalf of pro-Soviet governments or indigenous Marxist groups. In fact the Soviet government made precisely that claim—in Afghanistan. The Carter-Brzezinski innovations to justify a U.S. presence in Southwest Asia simultaneously justify the Soviet presence. Nothing illustrates more clearly how fighting fire with fire can backfire.

We should not be surprised that the tenuous U.S. military presence in Southwest Asia may be a Soviet asset. We have experienced the converse in our own country. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has been an asset to Carter's political fortunes, to Brzezinski's cold war hand within the administration, and to the Pentagon's plans for expansion of the armed forces. In turn, expanded U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf will strengthen the influence of the generals within the Kremlin.

This militaristic mutual stimulation is not a conspiracy of the U.S. and Soviet governments against the true security interests of the citizenries of both countries, but the consequences are the same as if it were. More accurately, the consequences are *worse,* because a Washington-Moscow conspiracy would rest on sufficient agreement between the two sets of rulers about the rules of the game to yield a greater likelihood of avoiding war than we now have.

Instead of creating a rapid deployment force in the U.S. armed forces, such a capability could be established in a multilateral force or preferably a transnational group, individually recruited and prepared to act on behalf of a regional organization or the United Nations. In addition, rather than an *ad hoc* anti-Soviet U.S. embargo of grain and advanced technology, the governments in the region could have been quietly encouraged in advance of any aggressive use of force to specify economic and diplomatic sanctions to be taken, in concert with others, against any state moving troops into the region.

Instead of a U.S. effort to find bases or new facilities for its military forces in the area, the governments of the region could be encouraged to declare themselves permanently nonaligned and nonallied with outside powers. If this had been encouraged earlier, if sanctions for violating a nonintervention regime had been specified in advance, and if the U.S. had not pressed a new military buildup, the Soviet calculus would have been much different. We cannot know

that it would have been enough different to have prevented the intervention. But that is not a good argument against having tried such a policy, especially when the prevailing diplomatic approach obviously failed. Nor is it a good argument against such a policy now, when nothing the United States is about to do militarily will remove Soviet troops from Afghanistan or prevent the oil fields from being destroyed should U.S. officials use force to come to their defense.

Instead of undertaking a policy that will certainly lead the Middle Eastern governments to argue among themselves over whether the uninvited U.S. security umbrella should be welcomed or rejected, the United States and other industrialized states could make a generous offer to stabilize the supply of and price for food and their manufactured goods exported to Third World countries. This offer could be made to encourage reciprocation that would guarantee a dependable supply of oil at reasonably stable prices for all countries which respect the nonalignment of the region.

Pakistan could be included in the arrangements for nonalignment rather than be offered military aid. The Pakistani government is contemptuous of democracy, human rights, and efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear technology. If policymakers gave greater weight to the needs of the Pakistani people, or even to the security needs of the U.S. citizenry rather than to the short-run growth of U.S. military influence and anti-Soviet military power in the area, they would find the present Pakistani government so devoid of merit as to deserve no U.S. military aid. To the extent that *any* indigenous government, regardless of quality, is preferable to one imposed or propped up from the outside, it is even more important to enhance a principle against the presence of all outside military personnel. Recognition of this value should restrain the United States from stepping up its own military assistance and presence in the area. This restraint would also encourage the Pakistani government to broaden its domestic base of support by respecting human rights more. This would be a more effective defense against the Russians than arming the present government against the interests of its own people.

The more comprehensive policy approach would also attend to the needs of U.S. citizens for petroleum. Rather than precipitously risking loss of U.S. lives by stepping up the role of armed forces in Southwest Asia, reinstating registration for the draft, and increasing military expenditures, more drastic steps to conserve energy consumption could be taken in the United States. If the situation in the Persian Gulf is, as the president said, the most serious crisis since World War II,[69] oil import fees, a stiff tax on gasoline, or a system of rationing may be sensible. Without these it appears that the Carter administration and U.S. public prefer to make an imperial show of military force in the Middle East, to pay for new bases and more military assistance to other governments,

69. *New York Times*, January 3, 1980.

to establish a mobile interventionary force, to buttress yet another military dictatorship, to increase the willingness to rely on national military force, and to escalate U.S.-Soviet military rivalry, rather than to decrease the amount of gasoline that goes into the tanks of U.S. automobiles.

In conclusion, I have attempted to illustrate how an alternative framework is useful for developing a U.S. foreign policy that plausibly could be more prudent and effective in advancing preferred values. This proposed approach seeks to deinstitutionalize war and to delegitimize military threats in diplomacy. It seeks to decrease the likelihood of war in the short run and simultaneously to increase the prospects for building a global, demilitarized security system in the long run. It would bring U.S. behavior into a new harmony with the values of global peace and justice.

A Note on the Utility of a Value-Centered Approach

This analysis is founded on the understanding that every policy decision involves a choice among alternatives, and every deliberate choice employs values as criteria for choice, whether or not policymakers recognize that they are using values. Indeed, "every human action, implicitly or explicitly, is an expression of value or an assertion of preference."[1] Values are the tools required to order potential outcomes on some reasoned basis. Whether to deploy the MX missile, for example, involves judgments about the value of peace, the value of military power in keeping peace, the value of the MX in accumulating power, and the value of military competition with the Soviet Union in achieving peace, to say nothing of many domestic political and economic values that a president may have in mind when making the decision.

Many officials and scholars say that foreign policies should promote the national interest. Such a statement often misleads the policymaker and citizen, especially if one falls into the habit of assuming that the national interest has an inevitable or necessary quality about it, or that it is foreordained and needs only to be discovered, or that it is beyond moral choice and value judgment. The national interest can be given meaning only by a deliberate, subjective selection of values.

Even if one decides that a key element of the national interest should be self-preservation, the process of selecting values has only begun. Who is the "self" to be preserved? One's own physical existence? the lives of one's family? all U.S. citizens? all U.S. citizens except those who die while fighting to assure a

1. Eugene J. Meehan, *Value Judgment and Social Science* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 25.

certain standard of living? the state as personified in a small governing elite? the human species? How one answers this simple question can lead to radically different instrumental values. For example, if one wants merely to preserve the life of one 's family or of the human species, a strong argument could be made for giving up a nuclear weapons capability entirely. Such an act, one might reasonably calculate, would reduce the likelihood that one would remain a target of someone else's nuclear weapons. In addition, the dismantling of over half of the world's nuclear weapons would reduce the damage to the environment and to human beings worldwide should a major war occur. An opposing argument could be made, of course, that dismantling a nuclear arsenal might invite a nonnuclear attack, or that the value of self-preservation is less important than other values which might be lost .

Clearly, policymakers cannot translate abstract values automatically into concrete policies. Yet in their deliberations and in public debate they usually shy away from considerations of the connection, if any, between what they do and the values they commonly profess. Most officials are far more comfortable debating technical issues than the fundamental values advanced by their behavior.

Seldom are there serious debates about the long-range value impact of economic and security policies which touch even the most serious life and death questions. We are conscious of this in other societies, but not in our own. It does not surprise us that the fundamental tenets of Marxism are not debated in the Soviet Union. Similarly, few in the United States seriously question nuclear deterrence. Discussion usually centers on how to integrate the latest weapons into the deterrence posture. There literally is more debate about how to increase the security of the Minuteman or its replacement than about how to increase the security of men and women.

If it does not automatically follow that more nuclear weapons yield more security, why has the leadership of both political parties never encouraged a national debate to consider alternative strategies in an effort to select the one that would produce the most security? Whenever a society *assumes* that certain policies flow naturally from an abstract value like peace or security, and that a careful assessment of alternative policies is not required, it is a sign that advocates of the policy being carried out desire it for reasons other than the professed value. One might guess, for example, that the United States procures more strategic nuclear weapons in order to serve values other than the security of the population, as officials claim.

Even though every approach to the making or the study of foreign policy is value laden, the underlying values are more often implicit than explicit. This lack of explicitness impoverishes reality and makes more difficult the rational selection of policy instruments to achieve policy goals. It inhibits self-government because the true purposes and value impact of policies are obscured. It discourages policy innovation because the failure to state values

openly makes the policymaker's stance invulnerable to attack until someone else exposes the value impact of official behavior. Even with many persons trying to perform a watchdog role, the imponderables and secrecy in foreign policy often obscure the value impact of policies until long after it is too late for the public or Congress to mobilize sufficient pressure to change policy directions. For example, had Henry Kissinger's standards been known for dealing with the democratically elected, Marxist President of Chile, Salvador Allende, his government might well not have ended in a flurry of U.S. efforts to encourage assassination and domestic violence. But the truth was not widely known until after Allende died and all Chilean political parties were banned by a new military government.

Officials seldom state the standards for their actions. Often they deliberately mis-state them. The standards that guide CIA actions, for example, are frequently subject to wide criticism whenever they are known. That is why they are kept secret. This is especially true when the standards govern CIA action in Third World countries where secrecy usually is not essential to U.S. security but is essential to U.S. manipulation of other countries' political processes. These standards are extraordinarily difficult to scrutinize preceding U.S. elections. During the spring of 1980, for example, the White House tried to influence the flow of events in Teheran even between a given Friday and Tuesday, in order to influence primary elections.

Rather than openly discuss the value tradeoffs of their decisions, policymakers in both Washington and Moscow usually claim that their policies have been deduced from the "necessities" of state practice or the "requirements" of the national interest. For example, after the U.S. military intervention in Iran in April 1980, to extricate U.S. hostages, Zbigniew Brzezinski said it should at last be clear that "This country will do what is *necessary,* and we have the means to do it."[2] Similarly, President Carter said that military intervention "...became a *necessity* and a duty...to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interest and to reduce the tensions in the world."[3] The purpose of moving any policy into the category of "necessary" is to remove it from examination and rational appraisal. Brzezinski sought to avoid an open debate about the relative weight he gave, say, to the value of human life, to the value of long-range security, to the value of enhancing national prestige or power through a show of force, and to the value of toughness and macho-diplomacy as ends in themselves. He wanted no weighing of lives lost as against lives preserved as a result of his policies.

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, quoted on NBC News, April 28, 1980. Emphasis added.

3. *New York Times,* April 26, 1980.

An approach that seeks to make values explicit[4] is more objective because value tradeoffs can be directly discussed. Consistency between means and ends can be more carefully reasoned. Precisely because this approach is more objective, it is less frequently practiced than the reality-obfuscating approach of political realism. Officials and their supporting intellectuals feel uncomfortable about using explicit values as standards for judging official behavior, for they are more interested in pursuit of power than pursuit of truth. Nonetheless, it is imperative for serious policy analysts to compare as rigorously as possible the value impact of official behavior to the professed or rhetorical values that rationalize policy publicly. Such an approach helps those rare political leaders who eschew the service of narrow, vested interests to explain more persuasively their policy differences with other politicians. This approach also helps the electorate more easily spot hypocritical leaders who serve vested interests not in harmony with benefits for the larger public.

A value-centered approach also lays the foundation for building a more cohesive world community because making behavioral standards explicit is the first step toward making preferred values universal in application. Assume, for example, that the idea of reciprocal rights for all nations will be central to the development of global community. Nothing does more to undermine this value of reciprocity than to allow officials to advance an implicit value of accumulating power while claiming that they serve the professed value of peace. A clarification of the behavioral attributes of a nation genuinely seeking to realize reciprocity and peace is of grave importance.

A value-centered approach also helps establish the idea that defense of values may, in the nuclear-ecological age, be more reasonable, desirable, and possible than the defense of territory. This opens the way for thinking imaginatively about social defense, or defense of a way of life, as opposed to an increasingly anti-utilitarian territorial defense.[5]

A value-centered approach forces policymakers and critics to return frequently to first principles. It helps distinguish the essential from the transitory and parochial during a time of rapidly changing material conditions and ethical standards of right and wrong. For example, one feels much differently about building the MX missile if one gives greater primacy to the value of power than to the value of security. In today's world, these two quite different values usual-

4. The merits of a value-centered approach are elaborated in Robert C. Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 23-28.

5. For a provocative discussion of cases when non-military defense of a way of life is more promising than military defense of territory, and for examination of ways to increase reliance on nonmilitary defenses while decreasing reliance on military defenses, see Johan Galtung, *The True Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1980), pp. 179-254; 363-371.

ly are mistakenly assumed to be identical or the pursuit of security is used as a self-justifying euphemism for the accumulation of power.

The most serious problems of our age arise from largely impersonal kinds of group interaction. Persons in positions of power may act ruthlessly on behalf of large groups of people, but usually not on behalf of their own personal moral responsibility. Often the actions of one group, such as a nation conducting atmospheric nuclear tests or fighting inflation, produce unintended consequences on another nation. In contrast, the direct impact of behavior by one individual upon another is small in comparison. Yet, the code of values we have learned from previous generations, which should help to humanize behavior, applies mainly to the personal interactions that have a much smaller impact on society than the political interactions between large groups. The inter-nation relations that are capable of inflicting irretrievable disaster upon the species are governed—or more accurately, left ungoverned—by ethical concepts and a code of conduct inherited from another era of history. Years ago it was less necessary for this code to cover more than the direct action of one individual upon another.

The drastic separation of individual ethics from political action occurred with the decline of monarchs and the rise of the idea that sovereignty belonged to a nation or state. The advance of technology and interdependency made the moral consequences of group interaction even more important than ever before. The moral code which restrained violence between individuals was not simply weak. Even more serious, people believed that it did not apply and should not be reformed to apply to relations between nations. Although security does not require a harmony of all people's interests, it does require some effective rules of conduct for group interactions, at least in the nuclear-ecological age. Without such rules, survival will be impossible.

The national-interest approach to policymaking, founded firmly upon the historical, ethical loophole described above, justifies almost anything in the name of the state. Governmental leaders may without hesitation commit violent deeds, regardless of their professed values, because they attribute responsibility for their acts to the state, even though it is incapable of bearing such moral responsibility. The consequences can be startlingly clear in rare glimpses into the corridors of power. To read the Pentagon papers describing U.S. policy in Vietnam, for example, "is to step through the looking glass into a new and different world. This world has a set of values, a dynamic, a language and a perspective quite distinct from the public world of the ordinary citizen...." Because clandestine warfare against North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, "...is covert, [it] does not exist...."[6] The activities of the FBI, the CIA, and White House

6. Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers* (New York: Bantam, 1979), pp. xxii-xiii.

agents during the Nixon administration's coverup of the events preceding and following the break-in at a Watergate office also revealed an incredible world where the values that normally govern behavior seemed totally irrelevant to those acting on behalf of the presidency.

The apparent irrelevancy of reasonable values is abetted by the continual refusal to utilize value standards for appraising political behavior. This deficiency occurs even when presidents are never subject to the charges or scandals that accompanied the war in Vietnam and the Nixon excesses. Jimmy Carter, for example, could be a good father, husband, and even a born-again Christian. But in being all these he simultaneously could kill—and in supporting deterrence he professes the willingness to do so—far more innocent people than Adolf Hitler dreamed of, without losing his credentials as a sane and even humane person. To blame a government or a state for political events is a convenient fiction but it is misleading rhetoric. When the state is treated as a real actor, officials and citizens escape their moral responsibility. A reluctance to examine the fundamental values of policymakers and a chivalrous agreement never to question the underlying motives or intentions of officials even through occasionally questioning their policies, have discouraged positive innovations in the code of conduct governing international relations.

If we are to survive the nuclear-ecological age, it is absolutely essential to conduct studies which make explicit the implicit, frequently disguised value priorities that motivate official behavior. We must understand accurately the operational values of decision-makers and their supporting publics, as well as the empirical impact on all human beings of prevailing value judgments. Only then will it become possible to have a solid basis for political action aimed at transforming the standards on which officials base U.S. policies. It *is*, as Jimmy Carter observed, too late for politics as usual.